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Reflections on Refuge in Hungary: A New Host Country 
Since 1988 Hungary has increasingly 
become a refuge for people who seek 
asylum and refugee status.' 
Immigration, which included a substan- 
tial number of ethnic Hungarians from 
Romania, as identified in Table 1, passed 
through three important phases. The last 
phase - the inflow of refugees from 
Croatia and Serbia - continues to 
receive a critical response from many 
levels of society and government in 
Hungary. The refugee regime's 
international community recognizes 
Hungary's vital importance as a new 
refugee-hosting country in Central 
Europe. 
Hungary became a new host 
country for refugees for internal and ex- 
ternal reasons. Hungary's model of an 
alternative between a socialist and a 
capitalist market economy began in 
196€i2 By the 1980s, economic alterna- 
tives to a rigid, socialist market system 
found their societal and political 
counterparts in emerging intellectual 
and social movements. These groupings 
and associations - which addressed 
environmental, peace and minority 
issues - were to provide a focus of 
interest for Hungarian political parties 
by 1989. Hungary's pluralism and 
democratization evolved over a period 
of two decades and gave the country an 
image of transitional change prior to the 
major turning-point of Eastern Europe's 
transformation at the end of 1989. 
Hungary's image of transition with 
stability continues to hold great 
consequence for the nation. The 
population is 10.6 million people. In 
addition, important ethnic Hungarian 
populations reside outside of Hungary. 
These neighbouring populationsinclude 
two million people in Romania; 250,000 
in Ukraine; 800,000 in Slovakia; and 
300,000 in Croatia and Serbia. These 
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populations' sociocultural transnational 
Hungarian identity directs their 
consciousness to the sovereign nation- 
state of Hungary, which means that 
respect, as well as lack of respect, for 
Hungarian individual, group and 
minority rights is an interest and concern 
that the Hungarian government cannot 
disregard. Therefore, the nation-state of 
Hungary has a permanent pull factor on 
ethnic Hungarian populations that 
reside outside of Hungary. The effect of 
this pull factor was partly responsible for 
the first wave of ethnic Hungarians 
refugees who flooded into Hungary 
from Romania in 1988. Romania's 
Hungary's image of 
transition with stubil$ 
continues to hold great 
consequence for the nation. 
repressive Ceausescu regime was the 
second factor that caused 11,745 ethnic 
Hungarians to seek asylum in Hungary 
this year. Severe hardship and lack of 
respect for ethnic Hungarians' rights in 
Transylvania drove them to flee 
Romania and seek refuge in Hungary. 
Hungary gave these "fellow 
Hungarians" a warm reception and 
generous assistance. A network of 
nongovernmental organizations was 
established to coordinate the reception, 
assistance and assimilation of these 
refugees. As well, the government of 
Hungary organized its Department of 
Refugee Affairs in the Ministry of the 
Interior after the first wave of ethnic 
Hungarian refugees from Romania 
arrived and settled. 
Two nongovernmental organiza- 
tions, the Hungarian Red Cross and the 
Ecumenical Council of Churches in 
Hungary, were instrumentalin receiving 
these refugees. Governmental authori- 
ties in Budapest, Bekescsaba and 
Debrecen subsequently recognized the 
need to receive and provide for the 
refugees. Refugee admission centres 
opened to accommodate their basic 
needs. Unlike the fate of so many other 
refugees at admission and reception 
centres, the ethnic Hungarians spent 
only two to three weeks at Hungarian 
refugee admission centres. Hungary had 
the socio-economic means to meet the 
housing, employment, health and 
educational needs of this first wave of 
refugees. Therefore, the decision to host, 
facilitate family reunification and 
assume costs of assimilation became an 
integral part of Hungarian social politics. 
At the same time, Hungary became the 
frant yard of refuge in Central Europe. 
The consequences of Hungary's 
shift to the front yard of Central and (by 
the end of 1989) "new Europe" were 
considerable. First, Hungary became a 
model for hosting refugees, mostly 
ethnic Hungarians from Romania. In 
1989 and 1990, which mark the second 
phase of refugee inflows into Hungary, 
the totals were 10,821 and 14,953 
respectively. During this phase the 
Hungarian government signed the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which 
became effective in Hungarian law on 
October 15, 1989. Although Hungary 
reserved the right to refugee status for 
individuals of European origin? it was 
the first former East European state to 
become a party to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and to gain a prominent 
position in the international refugee 
regime. Furthermore, Hungary's model 
was used by other East European states 
- Poland, Czechoslovakia and, in time, 
even Romania. Therefore, Hungary 
became the centre of a front line between 
Eastern and Western Europe. 
The second consequence of 
Hungarfs shift to the front yard and 
then to the front line of Eastern Europe 
put Hungary into the backyard of 
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Western Europe. In fact, Hungary 
became a shield that held back forced 
migration from Eastern to Western 
Europe. These fundamental transfor- 
mations began to make increasing 
demands on Hungary's capacity to host 
asylum seekers and refugees. At the 
same time, Hungary's expectations of 
assistance from the UNHCR and the 
international refugee regime were not 
met. Also, the initial socio-political 
consensus to host, assist and assimilate 
refugees began to wane. Towards the 
end of the second phase of refugee 
movement into Hungary in late 1990, 
socio-economic discrimination towards 
ethnic Hungarians began to spread 
towards other Europeans (for example, 
Albanians) and non-European asylum 
seekers and refugees in Hungary. 
The change from warm reception to 
discrimination of asylum seekers and 
refugees was the third consequence of 
the country's shift to the front and the 
backyard of the "new Europe." Hun- 
gary's transition from a socialist to a 
liberal capitalist system depended on the 
pace with which markets and 
international (i.e., Western Europe and 
the United States) investments 
accumulated in Hungary. The gov- 
ernment made a gradual transition, 
while politics became of vital interest to 
Hungarian pluralist groups and political 
parties. As a result of Hungary's 
democratization, all of the country's 
socio-political sectors participated in 
societal and political debates. At the 
same time, these debates increasingly 
coincided with negative socio-economic 
indicators. By 1991, inflation was at 36 
percent; unemployment was at 8 per- 
cent; gross domestic production was 8 
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acting as thef int  and 
the backyard of the 
"new Europe" seemed 
to be Hungary's 
particular position in 
the summer of 1991. 
percent. Housing shortages and strained 
social services in health and education 
also contributed to the change from an 
open reception to discrimination 
towards asylum seekers and refugees in 
Hungary. 
The warm reception during the first 
two phases of refugee inflows into 
Hungary weakened and turned into 
discord by June 1991. One popular 
solution to the problem was to help 
ethnic Hungarians in their communities 
of origin and thereby remove, at least in 
part, the causes for which these people 
Table 1: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Hungary* 
1988 1989 1990 June 1991 Total 
Asylum seekers 13,173 17,448 18,283 2,629 51,533 
From Romania 13,098 17,171 17,416 1,864 
ethnic Hungarians 11,745 10,821 14,953 1,864 
ethnic Romanians 1,097 5,545 2,358 
ethnic Germans 256 805 99 
From Soviet Union 488 413 
ethnic Hungarians 213 
others 275 
From other countries 379 
Recognized as refugees 95 2,561 149 
ethnic Hungarians 2,409 
others 152 
'Reproduced with the permission of Boldizsar Nu#, The Hungarian Refugee Law, Budapest, 
June 1991. 
might seek refuge in Hungary. 
Nongovernmental organizations and 
voluntary agencies began a-oss-border 
operations of assistance, for example, to 
Transylvania inside Romania. These 
initiatives seemed more appropriate as 
Hungary's capacity to host, assist and 
assimilate refugees waned. In fact, by 
June 1991 asylum seekers and refugees 
had to stay in Hungarian refugee 
admission centres for much longer 
periods than before. These people felt 
demoralized and marginalized from 
Hungarian society. Signs of alienation 
were even stronger for nonethnic 
Hungarian refugees, whose oppor- 
tunities for third country resettlement in 
Western Europe, Canada or the United 
States had greatly diminished to nothing 
more than an illusion4 
Bearing the burden and actingas the 
front and the backyard of the "new 
Europe" seemed to be Hungary's 
particular position in the summer of 
1991. The Department of Refugee Affairs 
in the Ministry of the Interior organized 
a centre to respond to forced migration 
into Hungary. Also, illegal immigration 
and human smugghg were taking place 
through Hungary's "green border" with 
Romania. At the same time, economic 
migrants sought so&-economic oppor- 
tunities in Hungary or migrated through 
Hungary to Western Europe and North 
America. As the categories of population 
movement became more numerous, all 
parties in Hungary recognized the need 
to inform and educate the public and 
thereby reconstruct the earlier consensus 
with respect to reception, assistance and 
assimilation of refugees. 
At the same time, all the parbes in 
Hungary perceived a future wave of 
asylum seekers, refugees and economic 
migrants. This flood, which was 
expected to come from the former 
U.S.S.R., would subject Hungary to 
successive waves of population 
movement into and maybe even out of 
the country. The population influx across 
the Ukrainian border was estimated 
from one to two million people. An 
operational network of governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations 
was in place in the northeast region of 
Hungary to handle the expected influx. 
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The reality, however, was different. 
Yugoslavia's war of societal and state 
conflict causedthe third wave of refugees 
into Hungary. By November 1991 6,000 
asylum seekers arrived daily, and by 
March 1992 there were 50,000 registered 
refugees from Croatia and Serbia. 
Hungary's response during this third 
phase seems to support the image and 
model of its original consensus at the end 
of the 1980s. Certainly receiving and 
assisting these refugees influenced 
Hungarian attitudes. Also, the arrival of 
these refugees into southwest Hungary 
- a new regional reception area - 
facilitated their reception and settlement. 
Once again, the major actors were the 
Department of Refugee Affairs, the 
Hungarian Red Cross and the Ecu- 
menical Council of Churches. Assistance 
from the international refugee regime 
and the European Community was slow 
to materialize. Once more, Hungary 
acted as a shield, which gave further 
legitimacy to its front and backyard 
position in the "new Europe." 
Conclusion 
the same time, however, this country did 
not receive-at least not soon enough- 
the expected financial or political 
assistance, i.e., third country resettle- 
ment for non-Hungarian refugees, 
which was necessary if Hungary was to 
be a model and effective key member of 
the new front line between Eastern and 
Western Europe. Increasingly, Hungary 
acted as a shield in response to the 
societal and political conflicts that 
displaced ethnic and nonethnic 
Hungarian populations. A current 
example is, of course, the refugee inflow 
from Croatia and Serbia. 
Hungary's immediate future is 
uncertain. Its transformation to a liberal 
capitalist system is not yet complete. 
The reality, however; was 
different. Yugoslavia's war 
of societal and state conjlict 
caused the third wave of 
refigees into Hungary. 
Hungary's profound transformations 
since 1988 have occurred at all levels - 
subnational, national, transnational, 
regional and international. In becoming 
a new host country, Hungary 
experienced three important phases of 
forced migration during the past four 
years. Hungarians' transnational 
identity undoubtedly contributed to 
their positive reception of ethnic 
Hungarian refugees. This shared ethnic 
identity, however, was not strong 
enough to prevent discrimination 
towardsrefugeesin1990and 1991. Socio- 
economic constraints and political 
uncertainties removed the earlier, 
favourable consensus to host, assist and 
assimilate asylum seekers and refugees 
in Hungary. 
Hungary's transformation into the 
front and backyard of the "new Europe" 
became a complex set of internal and 
external Hungarian relationships. The 
legitimacy that the new host country 
gained within the international refugee 
regime and thereby for the West was 
certainly a gain in status for Hungary. At 
Political and economic demands have 
been made on Hungarian society - 
demands that severely test the societal 
consensus necessary for the demo- 
cratization process to develop in this 
country. Respect for individual, group 
and minority civil rights are an integral 
component of this democratization 
process. Developing a civil society in 
Hungaryisavitalinterest of the stateand 
government. This civil society also forms 
the new core of the nation and the people 
of Hungary. Therefore, the strength and 
status of the Hungarian community -at 
both the state and interstate levels -are 
legitimate concerns and interests for the 
"new Europe" and the international 
community. 
In fact, Hungary's identity must be 
more than its front and backyard 
position with regard to economic and 
forced migration in the "new Europe." 
Comprehensive and extensive inter- 
dependence - the right of solidarity - 
is necessary for Hungary's security 
among European states and their 
transforming regional organizations. 
This greater interdependence would 
have to allow Hungary to drop its shield 
and thereby gain a multilateral security 
for its internal and external policies. 
Without this fundamental and necessary 
transformation, Hungary's future could 
become one of civil strife and societal 
conflict. These two classical causes of 
refugee flows would then revert 
Hungary from a new host country to a 
refugee-sending country. This should 
not happen. 
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